I develop a novel approach of modeling trade elasticities and quality to address two well-established facts about prices in trade data: (i) higher trade costs increase the price of traded goods, and (ii) high-wage countries trade (export) more despite charging higher prices. Leading trade theories, despite their massive success in explaining trade volumes, fail to explain either of these price facts and many variants have been proposed to account for each fact separately. I propose an extension of Krugman [1980] that accounts for both facts in a unified framework, while preserving the tractability of conventional gravity models. Since my model matches a richer set of facts, it also offers a richer set of implications regarding the scale and distribution of the gains from trade across consumers. To evaluate my assumptions on quality and elasticity I fit the model to highly disaggregated U.S. import data. To this end, I estimate trade elasticities for around four hundred SITC industries. Then, I calibrate my model to Aggregate trade flows and demonstrate its merits, relative to conventional gravity models, in terms of matching price data. My estimation results indicate that within each industry, trade (i.e. demand) elasticities are lower in high-quality HS10 product codes.
Introduction
Trade theory has been massively successful in explaining trade volumes. The volume of trade depends on the number of goods traded, the quantity of each good that is shipped, and the prices they are sold for.
However, leading theories of international trade yield predictions about the composition of trade (quantity, price and variety) which are inconsistent with empirical findings. Prices, in particular, are one key component of trade flows that theories of international trade have not come to grips with.
It is well established in the empirical literature that exporters "ship out the good apples". The higher the trade costs a country/firm faces the higher the free on board (f.o.b) price 1 of goods it exports to a foreign market. Leading trade models (in their standard setting), all predict that higher trade costs will lower the f.o.b price of exported goods 2 , which is at odds with empirical evidence. In these models it is usually assumed that one exports if the variety they produce is the cheapest in the international market. In the presence of high trade costs exporters could only export their cheapest products, so with the shipping cost added up to the final price they would still remain competitive.
One other well documented fact is that high-wage countries export/import more than low-wage countries even though they do not charge lower prices. 3 Again, his is at odds with the conventional practice in trade literature; to match bilateral trade volumes, assuming countries import the cheapest variety, there is, in the global market. Given that high wage countries export more (as seen in the data), conventional gravity models would generate prices of traded goods that are lower (on average) when coming from high-wage countries. 4 Many variants of the mainstream trade models have been specifically developed to account for each one of the above two price facts separately. 5 However, what is missing is a unified framework that incorporates both of these facts about the price of traded goods, without losing the explanatory power and tractability of conventional gravity models when it comes to explaining bilateral trade volumes.
In this paper I develop a gravity model that accounts for both the effect of trade costs on the price of traded goods, and the large trade share of high wage countries exporting expensive products. I argue that digging deeper into the composition of trade and building a more comprehensive model of international 1 Free on board price 2 See Baldwin and Harrigan [2011] for an extensive survey of literature on this matter. 3 Waugh [2010] provides a complete description of this fact. 4 In an Armington model countries that produce more appealing products (as determined by the CES weights) have higher wages but have a similar trade share to that of low wage countries. In the Ricardian- Eaton and Kortum [2002] -model high wage countries trade more but also charge lower prices. 5 The fact that high wage countries trade more has been addressed by Fieler [2011] and Waugh [2010] among others. Both papers are variants of the Eaton and Kortum [2002] model. Fieler [2011] assumes a two-sector world with non-homothetic preferences, while Waugh [2010] assumes poor countries face higher export costs. The effect of trade costs on the price of traded goods has been documented by Baldwin and Harrigan [2011] and Hummels and Skiba [2004] . Hummels and Skiba [2004] explain the fact with additive trade costs or the so-called Alchian-Allen hypothesis. Baldwin and Harrigan [2011] makes the theoretical assumption that higher prices reflect a more than proportional higher quality in a Melitz model. trade would strongly enhance our understanding of both the scale and the distribution (across consumers) of the the gains from trade. I also argue that relaxing the conventional structures imposed on trade elasticities would result in better estimates of unobserved trade costs.
My point of departure is a multi country monopolistic competition model of trade with homogeneous firms, as developed by Krugman [1980] . I depart from this baseline model along three dimensions: (1) I allow for multi-product firms, (2) I incorporate quality into my CES preferences, and (3) I relax the assumption that elasticities are the same across all varieties. A variety in my framework is characterized by the HS10 product code it belongs to, the country it comes from and the firm that produces it. I define quality to be any tangible or intangible attribute of a good that increases all consumers valuation of it. Quality in my model appears as the weight consumers put on certain varieties in their CES preferences.
In my framework quality has two components: a country-level component (macro-quality) and an HS10level component (micro-quality). Consumers attach higher value (in terms of utils) to varieties from certain countries, while some HS10 codes are also more appealing to consumers than others. The elasticity of substitution is assumed to be lower, i.e. demand is less price sensitive, in high-quality HS10 codes. I also assume that varieties manufactured by firms from the same country are closer substitutes than varieties manufactured by firms in different countries.
Within my theoretical framework I show that high-quality HS10 codes are traded more intensively.
Furthermore, as trade costs become higher, export activity shifts more and more towards high-quality HS10 codes. I also show that countries which produce the highest quality varieties have higher equilibrium wages and charge a higher price for their varieties. Yet, their varieties are the cheaper (compared to lowwage countries) for every unit of quality they deliver. Therefore, high-wage (high-quality) countries have absolute advantage in global markets.
The intuition behind my theoretical findings is the following. Since demand is less price sensitive in high-quality HS10 codes, firms charge a higher markup for varieties sold in those product codes. Besides, exporters who face high shipping costs will charge proportionately higher c.i.f prices for their products, but the higher price will effect demand, for their varieties, to a lesser extent in high quality product codes.
These two effects together, and the fact that firms incur a fixed overhead cost for exporting in each HS10 code, make high-quality product codes more enticing to exporters.
Countries manufacturing higher quality products will export more because they charge a lower price for every unit of quality, i.e. they have absolute advantage in global markets. These countries also have higher market clearing wages and import more. If firms enter the market of wealthy countries, the scale of sales will be larger. As a result, more foreign firms can overcome the fixed cost and break through into wealthy markets. Foreign firms who break it through, specialize in high-quality HS10 codes, and the more foreign varieties enter the market, the more demand is redistributed from low-quality product codes to high-quality product codes, so consumers can benefit the most from their "love of variety". That being the case, not only high-wage countries spend a larger share of their income on high-quality HS10 codes, but they also import relatively more foreign varieties.
Unlike Melitz [2003] , in my model trade does not have an anti-variety effect at the aggregate level.
If one looks at the big picture, the overall number of varieties always rises when a country opens up to trade. However at the HS10 product level the story can be very different. In high-quality HS10 codes the market will experience a dramatic increase in the number of varieties, while in the low-quality HS10 codes the number of varieties will always fall. The anti-variety effects of trade in low-quality product codes results from the fact that multi-product exporters crowd out multi-product domestic firms. However, multiproduct exporters, unlike domestic firms, will not sell in the lowest quality HS10 codes because generated profits in low-quality codes are not enough to overcome the overhead cost. In a representative consumer model this effect does not bear any welfare implication. When demand has a logit structure which is isomorphic to the CES demand, however, this finding implies asymmetric gains from trade. The consumers of high-quality products, i.e. HS10 codes, gain substantially while the consumers of low-quality products lose from trade.
After developing a theoretical model that is consistent with empirical facts on the price of traded goods, I take my model to data. First, I estimate demand elasticities (i.e. trade elasticities) separately for 390 5-digit SITC5 industries, using U.S. import data disaggregated at the 10-digit HS10 product level. When estimating the gravity equation using aggregate trade data, one has to assume demand elasticities are the same across all products to identify unobserved trade costs. Since the U.S. trade data documents price, freight, and tariff data, it allows me to identify elasticities without imposing that restriction. My microgravity estimation suggests that the elasticity of substitution is lower for high-quality HS10 codes. In the average industry, the estimated elasticity is 8.9 for the lowest quality HS10 code, while it is only 0.34 for the highest quality code. I also find that the elasticity of substitution is 1.3 times higher for varieties that are manufactured in the same country.
In the second stage of my empirical inquiry, I use the demand elasticities I estimated in the previous stage to calibrate my model to global bilateral trade volume data. My calibration exercise yields a couple of interesting findings. First, I find that my calibrated model generates trade costs that are 38% larger than the baseline model which assumes the same elasticity across all products. The result is not surprising because of the following; when one enforces foreign and domestic products to have the same elasticity of substitution, in order to match the high trade shares in data, they will generate lower trade costs. In a world where foreign varieties are assumed to be less substitutable, the same trade shares could be matched with higher trade costs. Second, my calibrated model generates country-level (macro) qualities that confirm my theoretical findings; high-wage countries produce higher quality varieties such that their varieties are cheaper for every unit of quality they deliver. For example, in the benchmark year, 2000, wages in the U.S. were around 37 times higher than China, but when I adjust wages/prices for the quality of varieties produced by both countries, the U.S. has a quality adjusted wage/price that is 10 times lower. Third, I show that my model matches unit value data (of traded goods) better than the baseline model which restricts elasticity to be the same across all product groups.
Within my framework, I then ask what kind of trade policy will benefit a country the most? I compare two different scenarios: (1) a 50% reduction in variable trade costs/tariffs, and (2) removing the fixed overhead cost of exporting. My counterfactual analysis implies that the number of varieties rises and the purchasing power of consumers rises for all product codes when fixed costs are removed, while lowering variable trade costs has an anti-variety effect in the low-quality product codes. In a world where the CEStype demand is generated by discrete choice logit preferences, my results indicate asymmetric gains from lowering variable trade costs-with consumers of low-quality product codes experiencing losses.
Explaining unit values (prices) in trade data has been an active area of ongoing research. The main competitor to my model in this area is the Alchian-Allen hypothesis which assumes trade costs are additive.
In an earlier piece of work-Lashkaripour [2013]-I use highly disaggregated data to show that trade costs resemble iceberg costs rather than additive costs. I argue that the results produced by Hummels and Skiba [2004] , on trade costs being additive, are driven by the fact that they misspecify unit values. An advantage of my framework over the Alchian-Allen hypothesis is that by assuming iceberg trade costs, I stay in line with the mainstream literature and generates tractable closed form results; something that models with additive trade costs fail to produce.
The existing literature that focuses on prices in international trade (e.g. Baldwin and Harrigan [2011] , Hummels and Skiba [2004] , Waugh [2010] , Hallak [2006] , etc.), generate results that are consistent with facts on either "the effect of trade costs on price of traded goods" or the fact that "high-wage (high-price) countries export more", but not both. The main advantage of my framework over the existing studies is that it naturally explains both facts in one unified framework. Also, unlike the existing literature on quality/price I do not impose systematic differences in demand (nor trade costs) across countries to achieve non-homothiticity at the cost of loosing tractability. In my model high-wage countries buy higher qualities, due to love of variety, even though preferences are assumed to be homothetic.
My paper also adds to another body of literature that imposes structure on demand elasticities to explain trade patterns. My model is particularly related to Fajgelbaum et al. [2011] and Coibion et al. [2007] . Both of these papers claim that high-quality varieties tend to have more attributes along which they can be Figure 1: Price elasticity of demand for various car products in the U.S. (source: Berry et al. [1995] ). differentiated from other varieties of the same quality. They, therefore, assume demand elasticity is lower for high-quality products. The first disadvantage with these models is that they apply their assumption to an ad-hoc non-CES demand system. The second disadvantage is that they do not estimate the demand elasticities explicitly. Not only my model incorporates the assumption that elasticity is lower in higher qualities within a Dixit-Stiglitz framework, but I also estimate these elasticities.
My paper is also related to a rich body of empirical literature that estimates demand elasticities. In the IO literature estimating demand elasticities for individual products, using highly disaggregated consumer data has always been a topic of interest. Theses researches need not to impose any restriction on elasticities since they usually have rich enough market data to back out elasticities for individual varieties. However, the finding that high quality products have a lower elasticity implicitly exists in their finding. Berry et al. [1995] for instance, estimate demand elasticities for the U.S. car market, and their findings (figure 1) suggest a low elasticity for expensive luxury cars and a high elasticity for cheap economy cars.
In the trade literature measuring demand (i.e. trade) elasticities has also been a vibrant area of research.
Feenstra et al. [2012] and Broda and Weinstein [2006] are examples of studies that move away from the standard assumption that elasticities are the same across all varieties. My paper is closest to Broda and Weinstein [2006] since they also estimate a separate elasticity for each HS10 product code. My paper adds to their findings in two ways. First, unlike Broda and Weinstein [2006] who look at only within-HS10 code variations in data, I also look at across-HS10 code variations which allows me to estimate systematic quality differences between product codes. This, in turn, allows me to identify the dependence of demand elasticities on the estimated qualities. Second, I allow for varieties manufactured in the same country to have a lower elasticity, while Broda and Weinstein [2006] impose the same elasticity for all products (and across all countries) in the same HS10 code. This restriction is fairly important because assuming the same within source country elasticity can result in under-estimating trade costs when one takes the model to aggregate data.
Theory
In this section I will introduce the main ingredients of my GE model. There are N asymmetric countries that produce differentiated goods using only labor. Country i is populated with a mass L i of identical agents, each endowed with one unit of labor. Firms in each country are multi-product and homogenous.
Geography is reflected in two kinds of barriers between countries: variable iceberg trade costs, and fixed costs of exporting in each product category. Product categories differ in how appealing they are to the consumers and how differentiated they are. Countries differ in endowments of labor and the quality/appeal of their products. I assume a market structure characterized by monopolistic competition. I start with the description of the commodity space and demand. Then, I turn to supply and the problem of the firm.
Commodity Space
I will refer to the final good an individual consumes as variety. A variety in my framework is characterized by the category it belongs to, the country it was manufactured in, and the firm that manufactured it. A product category is a 10-digit code from the HS10 product classification. For example, a 40" Samsung TV is a variety that falls in the HS10 code that contains 40" TVs, is manufactured by Samsung in Korea.
Mathematically, the commodity space can be expressed as
where F is the set of firms, C is the set of countries, and H = [0,H] is a continuum of HS10 categories.
Variety fch will be a commodity that belongs to HS10 (product) code h, and is produced by firm f in country c. A simple illustration of the commodity space is provided in figure 2. 
Demand
As noted before, each country is populated with a mass L i of identical consumers. In a standard Dixit-Stiglitz enviroment 6 (e.g. Krugman [1980] ), the preferences of a representative agent can be denoted by a three-level CES utility function
where C h is the sub-utility derived from the consumption of product h. denotes the elasticity of substitution among HS product categories. C h has the following form
where Q jh is the composite variety, i.e. sub-utility, from country j in HS code h Q jh = 2 4 X j2Fj q 1 gjh 3 5 1 q gjh is the quantity of variety gjh that the consumers directly consume. In the standard Dixit-Stiglitz framework, which is used by most leading models of international trade, the elasticity of substitution is the same (equal to ) across all varieties.
In my framework I assume each consumer has the following CES utility function 6 Dixit and Stiglitz [1977] 
where ↵ h is the appeal or, as I will call it, "quality" of products in HS code h, i.e. product-level quality.
There is a one-to-one mapping from the product space (H) to the product-level quality space (i.e. [0,H] ! [1,↵] where↵ is the highest quality). ✏ denotes the elasticity of substitution among HS product categories.
In my framework the second tier utility, sub-utility C h , has the following form
µ j is the quality of varieties manufactured in country j, i.e. country-level quality. I would like to emphasize at this point that quality in my framework has a pure demand side interpretation. 7 The elasticity of substitution among (composite country-level) varieties in code h is h , i.e. macro elasticity. The composite imported variety, Q jh , is
where h + (1 ) is the elasticity of substitution across varieties manufactured by firms from country j in HS code h, i.e. micro elasticity. ⌘ captures the relative importance of quantity versus quality. 8 A simple depiction of the patterns of product substitution is given in figure 3 . In my theoretical model, I impose two restrictions on elasticities. The first restriction is that higher quality HS codes are more differentiated and therefore have a lower elasticity of substitution. 9
The second restriction I impose on the elasticities is that varieties manufactured (by firms) in the same country are closer substitutes than varieties manufactured in two different countries. In other words, the micro-elasticity is assumed to be higher than the macro-elasticity. 10 Assumption 2. > 1 7 The way I incorporate a country-level quality, i.e. µ j , and a product-level quality, i.e. ↵ h in my demand is similar to Hallak and Schott [2011] . However, they assume the same elasticity of substitution across all varieties in the same 2-digit sector. 8 ⌘ is not just a parameter that scales quality. A high ⌘ means demand is more sensitive to prices (than quality)-an effect identified by looking at across product variations in demand. The effect is explained in more detail in 2.2.1. 9 Fajgelbaum et al. [2011] and Coibion et al. [2007] make a similar assumption, but in a non-CES demand structure. 10 If > 1 then h + (1 ) > h , given that h > 1. Each consumer in country i is endowed with one unit of labor and therefore will have an income equal to wage, which I denote by w i . Utility maximization implies that the quantity demanded in country i of variety gjh at price p i gjh is
where P i is the aggregate price index, P i h is the price index for HS code h, and P i jh is the price index of country j (firm-level) varieties in code h, all in country i. The (quality-adjusted) price indices can be written as P i jh = 8 > < > :
where F i jh is the set of firms exporting to country i from country j in code h. C i h is the set of countries that export their variety to country i in code h.
In the following subsection, I turn to describing the global equilibrium. As a rule of thumb, in this paper the superscript refers to the country that is importing the variety, and the subscript refers to the variety (e.g. gjh).
Supply
On the supply side every country is populated with a big pool of homogenous multi-product firms which can potentially enter various markets, and sell all the HS products. The entry scheme in my model is the following 1. Every firm pays an (separate) entry cost f e to enter each market.
2. After entry, an exporting firm pays an (incremental) overhead cost f for every HS code it exports. 11
Both the entry cost and the overhead cost are payed in terms of labor in the country of origin. The first assumption on entry is also taken by Eaton et al. [2011] , and the second assumption on the overhead cost is also adopted by Arkolakis and Muendler [2010] . All the firms in a country share the exact same production technology. For firms in country j, the cost of producing q units of product h and selling them in country i
portation cost from country j to i (⌧ ij = ⌧ ji ). Note that the marginal labor requirements for producing one unit of a variety in code h is the same everywhere. However with one unit of labor, some countries produce higher quality varieties than others, which is captured by the term µ j in the utility function. For domestic firms in country i the cost of producing q units and selling it domestically will be
Domestic firms pay neither fixed costs nor the iceberg transportation costs. The maximization problem of firm g located in country j exporting to country i is the following
More specifically, I assume that firms pay a fixed cost equal to f
is the share of firms that sell category h, from the total mass of firms which enter market i from country j . The assumption basically incorporates into the model, external economies of scale when introducing a new variety into a foreign market. This is an out of equilibrium assumption and ensures that firms will act collectively, i.e. ✓ i j (h) = 1 for every h that is exported, which makes the model much more tractable. 12 This assumption assures that the quality adjusted price of varieties from various HS codes is the same. My results do not depend on this assumption, but it makes my model more tractable.
Where p i gjh is the price the firm charges for variety gjh in country i, and H i gj is the scope of exports for firm g (i.e. the set of HS codes firm g exports to country i). The profit maximizing firms charge a category/quality dependent markup over the marginal costs
where again, C i h is the set of countries who have firms exporting their variety to country i in code h. The
is decreasing in h and, therefore, increasing in product-level quality ↵ h . The quality adjusted price, or as Hallak and Schott [2011] put it the pure price, of variety gjh is
Pure price is price per unit of quality and is the price that determines demand for every variety (equation (1)). As seen in equation (5), firms from country j all charge the same price. They all also make the same
Firms will export their variety in every HS code, as long as they make enough (marginal) profit in that HS code to overcome the overhead cost f
The above equation implicitly implies that domestic firms will sell their variety in all the HS codes (i.e.
H i i = H), given that they do not pay the fixed overhead cost.
Equilibrium
I denote the mass of firms that enter country i's market from country j with M i j . M i j is pinned down by the free entry (FE) conditionˆh
wages in country i are pinned down by labor market clearing (LMC) condition
The product market clearing condition is the following and clears by Walras' law
Given the market clearing conditions, now I can define the global equilibrium.
, a global equilibrium is a set of wages w i , mass of firm M i j , price indices P i h , P i , prices p i jh , and consumer allocations q i gjh , profits ⇡ i jh and scope of production H i j such that (i) equation (1) is the solution of the consumer's optimization problem.
(ii) p i jh solves the firms' profit maximization problem (equation (5)) (iii) The scope of production is given by equation (6) (iv) P i h and P i are given by equations (3) and (4) 
Gravity
In my model I have a two tier gravity equation. Let X i jh = P g p i gjh q i gji be total spending on varieties from country j in country i. Then the (second tier) gravity equation for product code h will be the following
i j|h is the share of spending on varieties from country j 2 C i h in code h; where C i h is the set of countries
One bold property of my gravity equation is that the trade elasticities, i.e. elasticity of trade volumes wrt to iceberg trade costs, are lower in high quality product codes (because h is lower in high quality-high ↵ h -HS codes).
The second layer of my gravity equation captures the relative spending on various HS product codes.
kh be total spending on varieties in category h, and X i =´h X i h dh = w i L i be total spending in country i. The share of spending on product code h, i.e. first tier gravity, will be given by the
A novel future of the above equation is that love of variety is stronger in higher quality product codes.
Therefore, if the number of varieties in a country rises, spending will be redistributed towards the higher quality categories so consumers can benefit the most from variety. For example, in country i, spending on good h relative h 0 is the following
Suppose the number of varieties in market i increase by a factor t > 1, i.e. M i j 0
. Putting it into words; if the number of varieties in country i increases, then country i will spend relatively more on high quality product codes. As we will see later,
the above condition implies that high wage countries spend relatively more on higher quality products; a novel result that comes without the need to assume some type of non-homotheticity in demand.
On the Identified Effects of ⌘, h , and ↵ h
In this subsection I will briefly discuss the different effects of ⌘, h , and ↵ h on demand and how they are identified. ⌘ can be separately identified from h using the following strategy: increasing ⌘ and lowering h proportionately implies that, within the HS code, the conditional spending on varieties will not be affected, 
Shipping the Good Apples Out
One empirical regularity that the mainstream trade literature seems to not account for, is the fact that higher trade costs are correlated with higher price/quality of traded goods. 13 In this section I will explain how my model accounts for this regularity.
For simplicity consider a world were iceberg costs are large enough so that domestic varieties are always cheaper than their foreign counterparts (even after adjusting prices for quality). This will be the case if the following condition holds 14
From equation (5) we know that firms will charge a higher markup in higher quality product codes.
Also, elasticity ( h ) is lower in high-quality product codes, so demand is less sensitive to trade costs in the high-quality codes. Given these two effects in higher qualities, i.e. (i) higher markups, and (ii) the price disadvantage of exporters 15 mattering less because their high-quality variety is not highly substitutable, I can show that exporters collect higher profits in higher quality HS codes 16
Firms charge zero markup for the lowest quality product category (
0) so they would not export their variety in the lowest quality HS code, but they would sell it domestically. As demonstrated in figure 4, there is a source-specific quality cutoff, and firms export only the HS codes which qualities fall above that cutoff
The cutoff is increasing in iceberg trade costs ⌧ ji which means that firms (or countries) facing higher trade costs will have a narrower scope of exports which consists of only varieties in very high quality HS codes. The following proposition summarizes this result regarding the effect of trade costs on the price and quality of the exported goods. 13 Baldwin and Harrigan [2011] have a survey of the leading trade models and show that all the leading models generate results that are inconsistent with this empirical regularity. As Hummels and Skiba [2004] show, the Alchian-Allen hypothesis can account for the effect of trade costs on quality by assuming additive trade costs. However, the fact that trade costs are additive can be disputed (Lashkaripour [2013] ) and moreover, assuming additive trade costs has the downfall of making trade models intractable.
14 In proposition 2, I will show that wages are higher the higher µ i . Therefore, condition 1 guarantees that 15 Under condition 1, we will have foreign entry only if > 1. If < 1 then having additional foreign varieties will have the same variety effect of having additional domestic varieties, but domestic firms/varieties will have absolute price advantage over foreign firms/varieties. 16 In the appendix I mathematicaly prove this claim. Proposition 1. Among foreign firms exporting to the same market, the one's that incur the highest trade costs (i) Have the narrowest scope of exports, and export their variety only in the highest quality product categories.
(ii) Export on average more expensive/higher quality varieties Proof. see Appendix Proposition 1 will still hold if I shut down product-level quality differences between the HS codes, i.e. ↵ h = ↵ h 0 for all h, h 2 H, and allow for only variations in h . In this case, firms facing higher trade costs will again have the narrowest scope of exports, and will only export their most differentiated (i.e. low h ) varieties. Moreover, since the the differentiated varieties are more expensive because of the higher markup (equation 5), the firms facing higher trade costs will also be exporting, on average, more expensive goods. 17 17 Corollary. Suppose ↵ h = ↵ h 0 8h, h 2 H, then among foreign firms exporting to the same market, the one's that incur the highest trade costs (i) Have the narrowest scope of exports, and export their variety only in the most differentiated product categories.
(ii) Export on average more expensive/more differentiated varieties
In the next subsection I will show why high wage countries export more despite the fact that firms from those countries charge higher prices. Waugh [2010] points out that, in the data, high wage countries trade more relative to their GDP, but in contrast to what Ricardian models predict, they are not cheap producers. Actually, the price of exported goods from high wage countries tends to be a bit higher . Waugh [2010] When a country produces high quality varieties (i.e has a higher µ i ) there will be more demand for it's varieties which results in higher wages. However, after deflating wages by the quality of the varieties produced in each country, one can show that the high quality countries ends up producing every unit of quality cheaper. This gives high-wage/high-quality countries absolute advantage in the global market, which explains why high wage countries export more. Note that in a baseline Krugman model ( h = and = 1) the quality adjusted wage ( wi µ 1/⌘ i ) will be equalized across countries in equilibrium, so conditional on geography all countries will trade the same. Proposition 2 captures the above result.
Why Wealthy Nations Trade More
: quality-adjusted wages are lower in country i (iii) Country i imports more (relative to its income) than country j (iv) Country i consumes (and imports) relatively more from higher quality HS codes
Proof. see Appendix.
The intuition behind why rich countries import more (ad thus export more) is two-folded. If wages in a country are high so is total spending; firms sell more in that country making it more likely for them to overcome the entry and overhead cost (which is payed in terms of wages in their home country). More varieties enter the market in high wage countries. In the presence of more varieties, due to the love of variety, demand shifts towards high quality HS codes with low h -so consumers can benefit the most from the higher number of varieties. Hence, high wage countries spend relatively more on high quality HS codes.
This result contrasts the claim in Hallak [2006] that one has to assume systematic differences in demand across countries (i.e rich countries value quality more) to explain the high quality/price of imports by rich countries.
Thus far we know that high-wage countries spend relatively more on high-quality HS codes. Meanwhile, In high-quality HS codes, consumers also spend relatively more on foreign varieties (that are more expensive) for two reasons: (i) demand is less price sensitive in high quality HS codes and (ii) foreign varieties are present only in higher quality codes. As a result, not only high wage countries spend relatively more on high quality product codes, but they also will spend relatively more on foreign varieties.
The Anti-variety Effects of Trade in Lower Qualities
Lowering iceberg trade costs in my model will lead to more foreign entry. Multi-product foreign firms will enter the market and crowd out a portion of the multi-product domestic firms. In a baseline setting ( h = and = 1) the total number of varieties will remain the same after lowering iceberg trade costs. Under the specifications of my model (assumptions 1 and 2), I can show that the total number of varieties in a market, P j2C i M i j , will always rise-when trade costs are lowered. The intuition is following: lowering trade costs, induces entry among foreign firms that specialize in high quality HS codes. More variety in high quality codes encourages consumers to reallocate their spending from low quality HS codes to high quality ones.
As noted before, In high quality HS codes love of variety is more prominent, and spending is more evenly distributed among varieties. This makes its possible that for every cheap domestic variety that leaves the market, multiple expensive foreign varieties enter, which in total, leads to more variety in the market.
Looking at the big picture, trade always has pro-variety effects at the aggregate level-a result not captured by Melitz [2003] . 18 However, after lowering trade costs some multi-product domestic firms leave to create room for the multi-product foreign firms. The multi-product domestic firms sell all the HS codes/qualities while the multi-product foreign firms only sell the high-quality HS codes. As a result, the number of varieties in low-quality codes drops, while the number of varieties increases substantially in high-quality products codes. 
In the CES context proposition 3 implies gains from trade for all households. In general, the CES framework with identical consumers has no implications about the distribution of gains from trade (since everyone gains the same). The CES interpretation behind the demand function in equation (1), is one extreme interpretation. The other extreme is the logit interpretation where every consumer draws taste from a distribution and spends all his income on only one variety. In the appendix I show that according to the logit interpretation, proposition 3 implies that when iceberg trade costs are lowered, consumers of the lowquality products lose while the consumers of high -quality products gains substantially.
It is worth mentioning that if the fixed (overhead) cost of exporting-f -is lowered to zero, the pro-variety effect of trade will be seen in all the HS codes or quality levels. When I map my model to data in section 3, I will compare the two policies (lowering variable versus fixed cost of exporting) in terms of their effect on variety in different quality levels.
Arkolakis et al. [2008] show that, in import data from Costa Rica, the number of varieties increase a lot when trade is liberalized. However, they claim that since the new varieties absorb very low market shares, the gains from variety are not significant. What proposition 3 tells us is that varieties do increase, but they do so in high quality/low elasticity product codes. If one restricts elasticity to be the same across all products, as in Arkolakis et al. [2008] , the gains from these new varieties could be small. However, if one takes into account the low elasticity of substitution for these new varieties, the gains from variety could be much bigger. 19
Mapping the Model to Data
In this section I discuss how I fit the model presented in Section 2 to data. First, I will describe the data and provide some preliminary evidence on product differentiation across different HS codes. Then, I will estimate my core demand parameters (by estimating a micro-gravity equation) for individual industries.
Finally, I will plug my estimated demand parameters into my model and calibrate it to global bilateral trade data. I will first analyze the predictions of my calibrated model and then I perform a counterfactual analysis to explore the variety effects of trade. 19 Mathematically, the change in real wage, i.e. V i = w i P i , from lowering tarde cost is 
Data description and preliminary evidence
The dataset I use in this paper is the U.S. import data compiled by Schott [2008] , which is publicly available.
The data, documents US import values and quantities from different source countries in various 10-digit HS10 codes. Every HS10 code belongs to a 5-digit SITC5 industry, and every SITC5 industry itself belongs to a two-digit SIC sector. Since the original data does not report SITC industry codes, I use the data compiled by Feenstra et al. [2002] to map every HS10 codes into a SITC5 industries. I will use the data from 1989 to 1994.
An observation in my dataset is an import record for an HS10 product, from an exporting country, in a My model assumes that all firms that enter the U.S. market have the same scope and price. Therefore, for every source country I need to have the number of firms that export to the U.S. in each SITC5 industry.
The assumption of my model is that all the firms have the same share from every import observation I see in the data. In the data, I see the number of individual export lines, i.e. individual export cards filled in by individual firms, associated with each observation. Since the number of export lines can be due to more quantity sold throughout the year, I take the average number of export lines per quantity sold by country j in a given SITC5 industry as a proxy for the number of firms exporting to the U.S. from country j in that 20 Khandelwal [2010] uses the aggregate CPI to proxy for the price of the domestic variety. 
Estimating Demand Elasticities
In this section I will try to identify and estimate demand elasticities h , ✏, , and ⌘. First, I perform my estimation using a baseline specification where I shut down variations in h across HS10 codes. Then, I will estimate demand, allowing for h to vary across HS10 codes and depend on quality ↵ h .
Baseline Specification ( h =¯ )
In my baseline estimation I restrict the elasticity of substitution, in every SITC5 industry, to be the same across all HS10 codes. More specifically, I let h =¯ for all h (HS10 codes) that belong to an SITC5 industry.
Then, I estimate demand (micro-gravity) for each one of the 411 industries in my sample, separately. In my estimation I will be comparing product-level qualities, i.e. ↵ h , across HS10 codes within the same industry. 21 I normalize this number so that the exporter with the highest number of firms will have a mass of firms (M US j ) equal to one. As I will discuss later, I normalize the number of U.S. firms in every SITC5 industry to one too. This implies that the country with the largest number of firms has the same number of firms, selling in the U.S. market, as the U.S. itself. If contrary to this restriction the number of U.S. firms is larger, then will be underestiamted. I will also be assuming that HS10 composite varieties are substitutes with elasticity ✏. Hallak and Schott [2011] and Khandelwal [2010] among others also compare qualities across HS10 codes and assume varieties in different HS10 codes are substitutable. The main reason is that to identify demand parameters one needs to look at across HS10 code variations. Another reason is that an SITC5 industry is a very narrowly defined class of HS10 codes. Hence, within an SITC5 industry, the 10-digit HS10 codes are comparable.
From equation (1), total U.S. spending on varieties from country j in HS10 code h (in a given SITC5 industry) will be
where M j is the number of firms in the SITC5 industry of interest exporting to the U.S. market from country j. p jh is the c.i.f price set by these firms for variety jh. P h is the price index of HS10 code h, given by equation (3), and P is the aggregate price index in the SITC5 industry that I'm preforming the estimation for.
In theory, the U.S. varieties were available in: (i) HS10 codes that are not imported, and hence the codes not observed in import data, and (ii) HS10 codes that are imported, as an alternative to imported varieties in those codes. In practice though, I do not observe U.S. sales by HS10 code, but I only have market share of U.S. varieties at the SITC5 industry level. I therefore assume the U.S. varieties constitute an independent HS10 code (i.e. outside variety). The price index associated with the U.S. product code will be
I normalize the mass of firm (M US ), the price (P US ), and the quality (↵ US ) of U.S. firms to one so that the price index for U.S. varieties will also be one (P US = 1). Total spending on U.S. varieties will be
Dividing equation (9) by (10) and replacing P US = 1, we will have
where j|h is the share of spending on varieties from country j in code h (i.e j|h = X jh X h ) . Taking logs from equation (11) and adding a year subscript t will result in the following equation (12) To identify , I will have to assume that the country-level quality µ jt varies across HS10 codes. However, unlike Broda and Weinstein [2006] , I still allow for the country-level qualities µ jht 's to be clustered by country, i.e. Cov[µ jht , µ jh 0 t ] > 0 for all h and h 0 in an SITC5 industry. However, I assume the µ jht 's are not corrolated across time.
Replacing ln µ jt with ln µ jht in equation (12) will give me the final demand, i.e. micro-gravity, equation
In the above equation I can not identify ⌘ and¯ separately from ✏, but is separately identified. Quality ↵ ht ↵ US,t is unobserved and needs to be estimated. One approach taken by Schott [2004] and Hummels and Klenow [2005] is to proxy for quality with f.o.b prices. This approach can be inconsistent with my framework, given that by definition high quality HS10 codes absorb a rather high market share conditional on high prices. A second approach taken by Khandelwal [2010] (which is standard in the IO literature) is to estimate quality as fixed effects. I cannot apply this approach since it will require estimating (13) with HS10-year fixed effects, which will not allow me to identify¯ . 22 My approach is a hybrid of the price-proxy approach and the fixed effect approach. I approximate the fixed effect, a strategy also implemented by Blundell et al. [1999] . 23 To this end, I use my models theoretical predictions about selection of firms into HS10 codes to find a proxy for product-level quality, i.e ↵ ht , that preserves the ordinality of the ↵ ht , but approximates the cardinality. Theoretically, ln ↵ ht ↵ US,t has the following representation
In the above equation ↵ ht cannot be separately identified from the sequence about the selection of firms, and thus ln µ jht 's, into code h to find an order-preserving proxy for ↵ ht . My order-preserving proxy for quality is the following
where is a parameter to be estimated, and↵ ht ↵ US,t is my proxy for ↵ ht ↵ US,t . Equation (15) approximates quality by attaching high quality to HS10 codes that have high market shares despite high average c.i.f prices that are not adjusted with µ jht s. In the context of my equilibrium, I show (proposition 4) that the term in the braces in equation (15) 
The first term, i.e. ✏ 1 (¯ 1) ln Mjt M US , tells us how much of country j's sales in code h are due to the number of firms exporting from country j. The second term, i.e. (✏ 1) ln↵ ht ↵ US,t tells us how much of country j's sales in code h are due to quality rank of code h relative to other HS10 codes in that industry. The third term, i.e. (✏ 1) ⌘ ln ln i j|h,t , tells us how much of the sales by country j in code h are due to its market share within code h, and that clearly depends on the magnitude of¯ 1 relative to ✏ 1. If¯ 1 is very high relative to ✏ 1 it implies that because it is not possible to substitute varieties belonging to two different HS10 codes, a high conditional market share within HS10 code h, i.e. i j|h,t , would translate into a high nominal market share within the industry, i.e. X jht X US,t . Finally, whatever is left of country j's sales, will be explained by the country-level quality, i.e. (✏ 1) ln µ jht .
Identification
To identify¯ 1 ✏ 1 , ⌘ (✏ 1), , and I will take the standard approach of using supply-shifters to identify the demand curve. For this, I find a vector of instruments z that are uncorrelated with the quality ln µ jht . Let
be the vector of parameters I estimate, and X be data on X ht X US,t , Mjt M US , i j|h,t , and p jht p US,t , then the moment condition will be the following
The above identification approach is also taken by Khandelwal [2010] , while Broda and Weinstein [2006] identify elasticity by assuming the supply shock (productivity) is uncorrelated with the demand shock (quality). I estimate the ⇥ parameters using a non-linear GMM procedurê
The optimal weighting matrixŴ 2 is calculated in the conventional two-step procedure. As note before, in constructingŴ 2 (i.e. variance-covariance matrix) I allow ln µ jht 's to be clustered by source country.
Since Mjt M US , p jht p US,t , and ln i j|h,t are all endogenous and correlated with ln µ jht , I have to find instruments that are correlated with these three variables but uncorrelated with ln µ jht . To identify the price coefficient, I will instrument price with total charges paid by exporters-which is equal to freight plus tariff charges.
As shown in proposition 1, freight charges are correlated with the HS code quality (↵ h ). However, freight charges are not correlated with the country-level quality (µ j ) 25 . µ jht does affects wages which in turn can influence freight rates. To take care of the possible endogeneity of freight rates, I run my main estimation without using freight charges as an instrument . I also use exchange rate and oil price multiplied by distance as additional instruments for c.i.f prices.
✏ 1 1 , the coefficient of the nested share ( j|h,t ), is identified by comparing varieties, belonging to different HS10 codes, which have similar prices but absorb different market shares. j|h,t is endogenous and correlated with µ jht . I instrument j|h,t with (1) the number of exporting countries in code h in year t and (2) the number of distinct HS10 codes that country j exports throughout the years 1989 to 1994 in the SITC5 industry that h belongs to. Both these variable are correlated with conditional nest share j|h,t , but uncorrelated with µ jht . 26 The number of distinct HS10 codes that country j exports throughout the years 1989 to 1994 is not correlated with µ jht under the assumption that µ jht 's are not clustered by year, but only clustered by source country, i.e. Cov[µ jht , µ jht 0 ] = 0 for all t, t 0 =1989-1994. Finally, I instrument for Mjt M US with population of country j, 27 and the average number of export lines per quantity sold by country j in the two-digit SIC sector which code h belongs to. I also use a dummy for membership in WTO/GATT as an additional instrument for Mjt M US . Table 1 shows the results from the baseline estimation. For 390 industries the two-step GMM estimator converges which implies that for 390 industries I have enough variation in my data to identify all four parameters in ⇥. For 82% of the industries the price coefficient is statistically significant and has the correct sign. For around 75% of the industries, the estimated is bigger than one and statistically significant, while it's very close to one or insignificant for the remaining industries. This implies that for the majority of the SITC5 industries, varieties produced in the same country are more substitutable which confirms assumption 2 in my theoretical model. the estimated¯ 1 ✏ 1 is larger than one and statistically significant for all 390 industries. Also nearly all the estimated values of are close to one as expected. .000 .000 .009
Alternative Specification
Two-step GMM p-value, .000 .000 .000
Number of SITC industries 390
Total observations across all estimations 270,327 
As discussed in the theory section, h 1 is identified from ⌘ by looking at across-HS10 variations.
Hence, estimating h with an HS10 dummy is not plausible. Since in my theoretical model I assume that h is lower in HS10 codes with a higher ↵ h , I will identify h by assuming a functional form for the dependence of h on ↵ h . However, I do not impose any restrictions on the direction and scale (and of course significance) of this dependence. More specifically, I assume h depends on ↵ h according to the following parametric
If ✓ 2 is negative and significant, then assumption 1 in my theoretical model is confirmed. To back out quality I can use the equivalent of equation (15), which I used for the baseline specification
The effect of ↵ h (on spending/market share) cannot be identified through the above equation inde-pendent of the effect of h , for the following reason. A lower sigma in equation (18) will mechanically overstate ↵ h because h and ↵ h have similar but not identical effect on market share, X ht X US,t . A higher ↵ h leads to higher X ht X US,t conditional on prices, while a lower h leads to a higher X ht X US,t unconditionally (since it simultaneously deflates the effect of prices on spending). To account for this problem I approximate ↵ ht ↵ US,t using the following equation
where¯ 1 ✏ 1 is from the baseline estimation and the remaining parameters ( , ⌘(✏ 1), and ) are parameters to be estimated. In the above approximation of quality, according to proposition 4, the term in the braces preserves the rank of HS10 qualities, ↵ h , if ✏ =✏. As before, corrects the scale, and since the above proxy is very close to the structural representation of (✏ 1) ln ↵ ht ↵ US,t , I expect to be close to one. Table 2 provides the results from estimating equation (17). given that I need more variation in the data (in terms of price and market share) to identify the parameters using the alternative specification in equation (17), the two-step GMM estimator converges for 322 industries, which is less than the baseline estimation. The price coefficient is statistically significant and has the correct sign for 78% of the industries. ✓ 2 is negative and significant for 82% of the industries, while the estimated is statistically significant and bigger than one for 72% of the industries. has on average the same estimated value in both specification.
Again, for nearly all industries the scale parameter is very close to one.
Discussion of Results
As shown in equation (7) trade elasticity is ⌘ ( h 1) which can be calculated multiplying the two estimated values, ⌘ (✏ 1) and h 1 ✏ 1 . The first result from the estimation of elasticities is that both specifications result in somehow similar trade elasticities. Table 3 provides a summary of statistics for the trade elasticities estimated according to both specifications. The composition of the trade elasticity is quite different in two estimations. In the baseline estimation trade flows are more sensitive to price (i.e higher ⌘), while when I allow for h to vary across HS10 codes, conditional trade shares within HS10 codes ( X jht X h,t ) are less sensitive to prices, i.e. ⌘ is lower. The reason is that in the baseline estimation, I am trying to match the high variations in trade shares (within the HS10 codes) with a relatively low elasticity (0.837), while some of these HS10 codes have an elasticity that goes as high as 8.936 on average. When I allow for elasticity to be high in low quality HS10 codes I do not need a high ⌘ to match the within HS10 code trade shares, anymore.
Statistic

Median
First quartile Third quartile Two-step GMM p-value, .000 .000 .000
Number of SITC industries 322
Total observations across all estimations 246,777 Trade elasticity ⌘ ( 1) in my model has the same effect, but yet a very different interpretation, as the Pareto shape parameter-✓-in the Eaton and Kortum [2002] model. Simonovska and Waugh [2011] find an estimate value between 2.79 to 4.46 for ✓, under different specifications. The reason the estimated elasticities are significantly lower in my model, compared to the estimated elasticities by Simonovska and Waugh [2011] could be one of the following. First, they use a very different identification strategy. They apply the simulated method of moments estimator that minimizes the distance between the trade volumes generated by the EK model to real data. Second, in the EK model (and hence, in their simulation) mass of firms/varieties is exogenously forced to be one. In my approach, Mass of firms is an endogenous variable, and I use data on mass of firms to structurally estimate trade/demand elasticities. Ignoring the larger mass of firms exporting from countries with high export intensities 28 , can result in over-estimating the spread of productivity to capture the high variation in trade volumes across exporters.
Another result from my micro-gravity estimation is that quality (↵ h ) varies quite a lot across HS10 codes.
Consumers on average value some HS10 codes much more than others. I can calculate the (across HS10 code) quality ladder for each SITC5 industry, S, as below 
Robustness Checks
I perform various robustness checks. First, I redo the estimation with a sample that has been trimmed with less restricting cutoffs. I rerun the estimation twice once for a sample of observations that report values above $7500 and once I use $2500 as the cutoff. The overall magnitude and significance of the estimated parameters is robust to how I trim the data. The same goes for within HS10 code trimming of the data. The results are robust to not dropping the highest and lowest 1% c.i.f prices in each HS10 code.
Second, my results are robust to the choice of instruments. I redo my estimation by dropping each instrument one at a time. The direction of the effects ( being bigger than one and ✓ 2 being negative) are not affected by the choice of instruments. Third, I redo the estimation with the following functional form
Again, the direction of the estimates are not sensitive to the functional form assumption on h . The reason I always include ✓ 1 is that ln ↵ ht ↵ US,t is negative for nearly all observations, and dropping ✓ 1 will mechan-ically force ✓ 2 to be negative, so that h can be be positive. Finally, I estimate the model without clustering the quality residual µ jht by country. This doesn't affect the direction of the results, but overestimates (the median) by around 0.15.
Calibration
In 
Calibration Strategy
Trade shares, i j i,j2C , are a function of the set of N countries, each with its population L i , wage w i , quality µ i and trade costs ⌧ ji ; parameters , ⌘, ✏, and { h } h2H that control the elasticity of substitution across varieties; entry cost parameter f e that govern entry decision of firms into different markets, and fixed cost f that govern entry decision of firms into different HS10 product codes in each market. I take the set of countries, their population L i , and wages w i from the data, and I calibrate
, f , f e to match trade flow data.
In the previous section I estimated demand elasticities for 390 SITC industries. To calibrate my model to global trade data, I normalize ✏ to two, as in Khandelwal [2010] or Berry et al. [1995] . I then use the median estimated value for the remaining demand parameter-, ⌘, and { h } h2H . More specifically, I let = 1.33, h 1 = 15.9 + (↵ h ) 0.804 , ⌘ = 0.014, and ln↵ = 5. 29
Before, I assumed domestic and foreign firms all pay the same entry cost f e , and foreign firms pay an extra overhead cost f for each HS code they export. In my calibration exercise I assume that the entry cost by foreign firms is also different and equal to f e + f x . I normalize f e to one since the scale of f e only affects the scale of firm entry (M i j ), but not the relative mass of firms in the market. In the following, I will describe my strategy for identifying iceberg trade costs-{⌧ ji } N j,i=1 -and country level qualities-
Iceberg trade costs I assume that iceberg trade costs take the form
The term ⌧ dist ⇤ ⌧ border ⇤ ⌧ lang ⇤ ⌧ agreement is the proxy for geographic barriers, and the number 1 added to it is the production cost. Variable D ji is the distance (in thousands of kilometers) between countries j and After substituting fixed and variable trade costs and the implicit solutions for country-level qualities,
, the moment condition (minimized in the outer-loop) can be written as
where, i j is share of spending on varieties from country j in country i. Each element in the above (N 1) ⇤ (N 1) vector characterizes the distance between the respective model outcome (given the parameters) and the outcome in the data.The calibration's objective is to minimize the sum of the squared differences between the model outcomes and the data targets for these outcome. I normalize the wage and quality of the US varieties to 1 and 100 respectively. 
Quantitative predictions
In this section I will illustrate the quantitative predictions of my calibrated mode. To test this claim, I calibrate a baseline model with = 1 and ⌘( 1) = 0.837 to the global bilateral trade data. The calibrated iceberg trade costs are around 38% lower than the calibrated values from my main specification where the within source country micro-elasticity is 33% higher than the across country macro-elasticity ( = 1.3). This result is quite striking given that it adds up even more to the mystery of why trade costs are so high. The result also suggests that if one decomposes the gains from trade into gains from variety and gains from price; the gains from variety will be relatively higher under the correct demand structure.
One shortcoming of the mainstream trade models is that they either predict lower prices for varieties exported from high wage countries (Ricardian models) or they predict the same price per unit of quality for all countries, conditional on geography (baseline Krugman model). In proposition 2, I showed that my 
The Effect of Trade on Variety: a Counterfactual Analysis
As noted in section 2 of the paper, lowering iceberg trade costs will decrease the number of varieties in the low-quality HS10 codes, but will dramatically increase the number of high-quality varieties. With the logit interpretation of demand, consumers who buy only one variety from one HS10 code, will be affected according to the price index in that HS10 code. Hence, the anti-variety effect of trade in low-quality HS10 codes can have anti-welfare effects for a portion of the consumers who strongly prefer the low-quality HS10 codes.
In this section, I perform a counterfactual analysis based on my calibrated model of the global economy to quantify the variety effects of trade. I will first analyze the effect of a 50% drop in variable trade costs on purchasing power (i.e. wi P i h ) in different HS10 codes in each country. In the counterfactual experiment, the general equilibrium is resolved for the new trade values, and the new measure of purchasing power is calculate using the counterfactual wage and (quality adjusted) price index. In table 8, the first column reports changes in wage when iceberg trade costs fall by 50%. The remaining columns report the change in purchasing power ( wi p i h ) for five different HS10 codes or quality levels. With a logit interpretation of demand 32 , the first HS10 code (h = 1) could be thought of as the group of consumers who have a strict preference (taste) for product one ( h = 1), and so forth. 31 Since the U.N. Comtrade data base does not report quantity of trade, I use the data compiled by Feenstra et al. [2005] to calculate unit values in the benchmark year, 2000. 32 In the appendix I show that logit preferences are isomorphic to CES preferences and produce the same demand function. However, there is avery different interpretation behind each one of them.
The results in table 8 suggest that lowering iceberg trade costs can result in very unevenly distributed equilibrium gains/losses. The purchasing power always drops in the low qualities, while in the highest quality product code, the purchasing power doubles on average. Another expected pattern is that asymmetric effects of trade hit smaller economies, and marginal qualities harder. In Austria, for example, purchasing power for high quality products increases around 300%-more so for products of medium-high quality-while purchasing power for low-quality products drops up to 20%-again more so for medium-low qualities.
As noted before, removing the fixed exporting cost-f -will, on the other hand, have pro-variety effects in all product codes/qualities. To demonstrate this result, I perform a second counterfactual experiment where I lower the fixed cost of exporting-f . The results is provided in table 9 suggesting that the purchasing power (and also the number of varieties) increases evenly in all product codes/qualities. Table 8 : Gains from lowering iceberg trade costs by 50%, across different consumer groups. 
Conclusion
In this paper I have shown that instead of imposing restrictive assumptions on demand elasticities to back out unobserved trade costs, using aggregate trade data, one could first back out the correct demand structure using disaggregated data were trade costs are observable. Then using the correct demand structure we can identify the correct trade costs in aggregate data. The advantage of implementing this strategy is that (i) I can also match price moments in the trade data rather than just moments on trade volumes, and (2) I will have a better estimate of the unobserved trade costs at the aggregate level. In particular, I have show that when one ignores the higher degree of substitutability between varieties manufactured in the same country, they will underestimate trade costs by a big margin.
The main merit of my model, theoretically and empirically, is generating results that are consistent with not only data on bilateral trade volumes, but also data on the price (and quality) of traded goods. In my model this property is achieved in a Dixit-Stiglitz (CES) framework without imposing any kind of nonhomotheticity assumption on demand.
Another aspect of my model that I do not fully explore in this paper is the distribution of gains from trade. Since the model matches the fact that trade favors high quality products, it generates a richer set of results regarding the gains from trade. As a result of lowering iceberg trade costs, purchasing power in high quality products rises dramatically at the cost of lower purchasing power in low quality products.
